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Prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, historian Afsaneh Najmabadi points 
out, Tehran had a reputation in the West as being a “gay paradise.” In the 
present day, Iran attracts Western attention for the apparent contradiction that 
sodomy (often conflated with modern gay identity) is punishable by death but 
transsexuality is a state-sanctioned practice through which individuals may 
change gender markers and obtain reassignment surgeries. Both narratives 
obscure a complex history of transsexuality within Iran. Najmabadi, an Iranian 
feminist historian and professor at Harvard, offers a detailed account of how 
gender reassignment was treated by the Iranian state from about 1970, in the 
waning days of the Pahlavi regime, until just after the revolution of 1979. She 
tells a story of friction between older and newer gender and sexual categories, 
of changing medical discourses about gender reassignment and sex change, 
and of individuals who were creative and resourceful in living their lives in an 
atmosphere of anxiety about shifting gender norms. Drawing on mass media and 
medical documents as well as interviews, this chapter shows how gender non-
conforming people carved out spaces of relative acceptance in entertainment and 
media professions, and demonstrates the ways in which lines between what was 
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 then designated as gay and trans were far blurrier than they subsequently became 
in post-revolutionary Iran. With this historical background to Maryam Mulk-
ara’s successful petition for a fatwa permitting transsexuals to transition legally, 
Najmabadi tracks the emergence of a transsexuality that operated alongside, 
but independently of, different transsexualities in Europe, North America, and 
elsewhere. 
 
Tehran in the early 1970s offered a spectrum of overlapping conceptions of 
maleness and masculinities. This spectrum structured everyday practices of life 
with regard to non-heteronormative male gender/sexual desires, and it construed 
non-heteronormative maleness as being at once criminal, immoral, and theatrical. 
This article offers a preliminary mapping of that scene. It is not, and cannot be, a 
social history of “gay Tehran.” Although the available scholarly writing on this 
topic agrees on the existence of an “active gay subculture”1 in 1970s Tehran, this 
literature is anecdotal, and the critical archival research necessary to produce a 
proper history remains yet to be done. But I also want to argue that to name the 
1970s as the decade of a gay Tehran obscures important (in)distinctions between 
what is now named gay (always considered male in this context by all writers 
on the topic) and what is now considered MtF trans. My purpose is thus to offer 
an initial survey of the complex overlaps and connections between these sorts 
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 of non-heteronormative lives. I want to trace continuities across the “before” 
and “after” of the 1979 revolution, as well as note the ruptures introduced by 
regime change into the scene of male non-heteronormativities. Simply casting the 
advent of the Islamic Republic as the brutal end of Gay Tehran does not do justice 
to the complexity of the tale.
The story of “Gay Tehran” in the 1970s has been articulated in at least 
two domains. At the time, there were a number of articles about Tehran’s “gay 
scene” in the American gay press, which reported its extermination by the 
policies of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s.2 There is an implicit progressivist 
dynamic to these stories: the emerging gay subculture of Tehran would have 
evolved naturally into a livelier, more open, gay Tehran, except that its life was 
cut short through the 1979 revolution and subsequent Islamization of society. As 
Jerry Zarit’s end-of-the-decade article put it succinctly, “Iran was for me, and for 
others like me, a sexual paradise. In terms of both quantity and quality it was the 
most exciting experience of my life.”3 The quests of Western gays for a sexual 
paradise in Iran specifically, while unselfconsciously reenacting broader cultural 
tendencies to sexualize an exotic “Orient,” were most likely influenced by the 
publication and enormous popularity of Mary Renault’s The Persian Boy in 1972, 
which was widely reviewed and reported on in the American gay press in the 
70s.4 
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 A second domain for the formation of the “Gay Tehran” story has been 
within Iranian diasporic gay communities—some members of which personally 
experienced the 1970s there.5 But their recollections are narrated through later 
gay identification developed in their new homes, which, in the 1980s and 1990s 
when much of this immigration took place, were dominated by a particular style 
of sexual identity politics. The Iranian gay diasporic progressivist narrative was 
informed by this sensibility—and through the lens of later identities, earlier 
sexual and gender subjectivities and practices came to be seen as problematic and 
backward. 
From its earliest manifestation in the diasporic press, Iranian gay identity 
marked its emergence through a disidentification with that past. This included a 
very clear demarcation between hamjinsgara’i [same-sex inclination/orientation] 
and hamjinsbazi [same-sex playing].6 The former has been embraced as a modern 
form of identification that outwardly expresses a true inner self; hamjinsbazi, on 
the other hand, has been disavowed, perhaps because of its pejorative use by 
government officials, in condemnatory religious texts, in pathologizing contexts 
by medical professionals, or in hostile general usage within Iranian society and 
culture at large. The disavowal of hamjinsbazi by diasporic gays has been 
articulated through turning societal and cultural abjection back onto the concept 
itself: they disavow same-sex-playing due to its presumed abusive character, and 
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 its being marked by disparities of age and economics. This is in contrast to same-
sex-oriented relations (characterized as hamjinsgara’i) that allow for genuinely 
egalitarian romantic relationships among same-sex partners.7 The differentiating 
move between hamjinsgara’i and hamjinsbazi thus articulates a homonormative 
response to an anti-heteronormative project.8
The imaginary of “Gay Tehran” works differently in these two domains. 
For the growing gay liberation movement of the 1970s in the United States, 
traveling to “Gay Tehran,” in fiction or in person, was a search for one’s “own 
kind” beyond national borders. In that sense, it fit well with liberationist dreams 
of the internationalization of activism, and with solidarity work based on “finding 
the same everywhere” (as in, “Sisterhood is Global”).9 Within diasporic Iranian 
gay activist politics, imagining the “Gay Tehran” of the 1970s offered a critical 
intervention into the Iranian cultural politics of denial that insisted on the 
foreignness of non-normative gender/sexual desires and practices. My point here 
is not to question the sociological existence of such non-normative desires and 
practices, but to suggest, rather, that imagining them and the period of 1970s as 
gay may prevent other, equally pertinent ways of thinking about the scene of male 
non-normative gender/sexuality during that decade. Actively un-familiarizing 
ourselves with what already has been read through the prism of “Gay Tehran” 
would, I hope, open up the possibility of seeing differently, and asking different 
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 questions about, non-heteronormative practices of life at that time. 
 
The Spectacle of Unmanly Males
 
The “Gay Tehran” I wish to reread was part of a complex, rapidly growing urban 
society, in certain domains of which particular styles of non-heteronormative 
male lives were becoming somewhat visible. This was particularly the case in the 
growing entertainment industry, which ran the gamut from high-quality modern 
film and television shows to nightclubs that catered to a range of class-inflected 
tastes. “Lower class” clubs were performance venues that sustained older and 
more traditional forms of male dance and entertainment, while the performance 
of such dances in newer, more cosmopolitan nightclubs, and in film, made them 
more visible to a layer of the urban middle-class population that may not have 
been exposed to them in earlier decades; indeed, the urban middle class may 
well have developed its sense of modern-ness in part from the disavowal of such 
cultural enactments. 
Stories of females living unusual masculine lives fascinated the public 
during this period; such stories were common features in history books, 
neighborhood gossip, newspapers, and magazines from 1950s through the 
1970s.10 In many of these cases, especially in the women’s press of the 1960s, the 
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 stories of females living masculine lives would be rescued from the suspicion 
of “improper sexuality” through the affirmation of a modern marriage ideal, the 
failure of which had pushed women into these unusual paths, through cruel 
arranged marriages or good-for-nothing husbands. Alternatively, economic 
hardship and the social inhospitality of many professions to women were said to 
have forced the choice of masculine living. This acceptable configuration of 
public female non-normative gender self-styling did not have an equivalent for 
males: males who did not or could not marry and perform their “marital duties” 
could not get away from their social obligations through a surfeit of feminine 
performance. 
In earlier eras, a male dressing as a woman and opting for a womanly 
career constituted “housewifery,” that is, becoming a male kept by a man.11 By 
the mid-twentieth century, such a practice of life was no longer possible; it would 
have added scandalous shame to the insult and injury of refusing adult manhood. 
Males then who wanted to live womanly lives tended to keep it a secret, fearing 
censure and punishment. Such was the fate of a male person who had worked for 
19 years as a masseuse in a women’s public bath.12 In another case, a male person 
who had lived and worked for the previous 50 years as a woman was forced into 
men’s clothes, with her hair shaved off her head.13 In yet another case, a male 
person refused to leave the hospital in men’s clothes, after being forced to 
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 undergo “disambiguating sex-surgery,” and declared her intention to continue 
living a womanly life.14 Reports of such incidents in the press never had an 
admiring or approving edge to them; rather, they were cause for apprehension and 
incomprehension. 
A less scandalized report on a “young man who dresses and behaves in a 
completely contrary fashion,” who wore his hair long and was a dancer, 
constituted an exception: he was considered to stand out as “a red bean on the 
surface of rice pudding” (i.e., he was a spectacle). The magazine Khvandaniha’s 
lengthy account of the case was made possible in part through displacing his 
contrarian self-presentation onto his “unusual background,” the product of an 
Azerbaijani father and a mother from Istanbul.15 The report vacillated in tone, 
sometimes sympathetically presenting the “young man” as a philosophically-
oriented intellectual, at other times as a weird recluse, and sometimes as someone 
whose unconventional self-presentation produced unwanted social reaction: he 
was followed by curious street kids who made fun of him; he had been arrested 
twice for appearing inappropriately in public. A line drawing of his face 
(compared to a full stature photograph) made his face look more female by 
emphasizing his plucked eyebrows and giving him fuller hair. He was said to 
have eventually opted for a more routine life, by opening a sandwich shop on 
Maulavi Street in a popular southern Tehran neighborhood. This “young man’s” 
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 style of public self-presentation, and his former profession as a performer in an 
Azerbaijani dance troupe, positioned him at the very limit of social tolerance: 
there was an accepted, if marginal, vocation for males to dance or otherwise 
perform female roles in theater and, more recently, the cinema.
  The figure of the male performer or dancer has a long history in Iran. 
Anthony Shay’s numerous essays offer us a rich conceptual vocabulary for 
understand the cultural work of this figure and its history, not only for the Tehran 
of the 1970s, but also into the present. Several of Shay’s propositions are 
pertinent here. He challenges “the romantic views that many gay men hold that 
the presence of male dancers and the sexual interest expressed toward them by 
Middle Eastern men somehow constitutes evidence for an environment accepting 
of homosexuality and a utopian gay paradise,” and “the oft-expressed viewpoint 
that male dancers were imitating or parodying women…. The presence of male 
dancers, professional and nonprofessional, in public and private space requires a 
(re)evaluation of the meaning of these male bodies.”16 Shay argues that in the 
1970s in Iran, modern choreographers attempted to eradicate traces of the earlier 
male choreographic tradition by creating what he calls hypermasculine styles of 
movement for male dancers, often within “folk dance” choreographies, “suitable 
to the urban Westernized male and their sensitive elite audiences.”17 As he notes, 
the older style of male dancers continued their performances in the “gritty 
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 underworld” of nightclubs and cafés. Indeed, “In the late 1960s and early 1970s a 
wave of nostalgia for Qajar-era [pre-1925] performing and decorative styles 
swept through Tehran, where a number of cafés sprang up in which former boy 
dancers, now elderly but still capable performers, appeared.”18 The sharp 
contrasts between the two modes of male dance performance, Shay concludes, 
point to “the underlying changes in attitudes toward sexuality and gender.”19 
Because male dancers and zan-push [woman-attired] actors continued to 
work in the café entertainment scene as well as in some of the “grittier” 
nightclubs, these more traditional male dancers and entertainers increasingly may 
have been marked, for the emerging urban middle classes, as a lower-class taste 
tainted by the immorality of a suspected sexual availability. But the figure of the 
female-attired male actor/dancer attained a new, somewhat more respectable, life 
in the cinema and in “legitimate” theatrical productions.20 The dominant style of 
male-actors-performing-female-roles was what William Beeman has 
called “pretend mimic,” that is, looking like a woman but achieving a “distance” 
from the female through the exaggeration of clothing, make-up, voice, and body 
movements. It was a style of performance already prevalent in the 1940s and 
1950s, and there was a significant traffic, even then, between the worlds of stage 
and screen and the ongoing public conversations about sex change, which 
circulated around such figures. 
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 In 1955, for example, Khvandaniha published in its regular “Album of 
Artists” page a picture of the actor ‘Ali Tabish, dressed as woman, along with a 
commentary entitled “Is this a man or a woman?” (Figure 30.1): 
You have frequently read in the press that in such and such corner 
of the world, for example in Europe or America, a woman or a 
man was fed up with her/his own (sex!) and with a surgery her/his 
constitution was changed. 
This (twentieth century whim) has not yet found adherents 
in Iran, so the man you see in this picture in women’s clothes, 
standing with special coquettishness, is our very own famous 
actor ‘Ali Tabish. Since he hasn’t had any luck with manhood, he 
decided to don for a few hours the attire of (devil’s apprentices), 
not in street and public but in the play (Charley’s Aunt) in which 
he plays the role of a capricious woman.21
 
<INSERT FIGURE 30.1>
 
Zan-push performances were included in many pre-Revolutionary films of the 
so-called “Film Farsi” period, including Madmuvazil Khaleh (Ms. Auntie, 1957, 
dir. Amin Amini) with ‘Ali Tabish playing the aunt figure; Zalim-bala (translated 
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 on the film posters as The Naughty Girl, 1957, dir. Siamak Yasami); and Shabaji 
Khanum (1958, dir. Sadiq Bahrami). The anxious fantasy of waking up as the 
other sex was reflected in the satirical 1959 film, ‘Arus Kudumeh? (Which One is 
the Bride, dir. Farrukh Ghaffari).22
As Beeman notes, “Sexuality is also an important undertone for 
the ‘mimetic’ female portrayers.… Since these actors, with few exceptions, claim 
to be fully heterosexual males, this situation can be an uncomfortable social 
position for them.”23 This “uncomfortable social position” was much murkier for 
male dancers who performed in the “gritty world” of lower-class nightclubs. In 
the 1950s, Khvandaniha and other magazines would publish alarming reports, 
with lurid photographs, about the nightclub life of Tehran (as well as major 
European cities), emphasizing that these spaces were populated by men dressing 
up as women to exploit male clients.24 They depicted a steamy and seamy 
nightlife in which hard-working citizens, lured by the temptations of alcohol, 
music, and dance, would be taken advantage of and robbed by “available” male 
and female performers. According to one 1954 report, of a total of 332 cafés and 
restaurants in Tehran, only a dozen actually offered musical and dance 
performances. These were said to be clustered largely in two areas of Tehran—
Laleh-zar and the district around Shahr-i nau (Tehran’s red-light district). The 
report further implied an overlap between sex-work and the entertainment offered 
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 in these nightclubs by describing several of them as run by women named 
Khanum, a designation often used, in this context, for women who bossed their 
own group of sex-workers. The report included several photographs of performers 
and clients, including one of a male dancer, Baqir Namazi [Figure 30.2].25
 
< INSERT FIGURE 30.2>
 
  At other times, a male dancer would come to public attention 
accidentally—often in the context of charges of “taking advantage” (ighfal, a 
word with a high sexual charge) of men, or of scuffles leading to injuries and 
pressing of charges, all of which worked to consolidate the association of 
criminality and public disturbance with non-normative gender/sexual 
presentations. Such was the case of Akbar Burzabadi, who was arrested after 
knifing one of a group of young men who had been harassing him on a Tehran 
street. Akbar was “a woman-presenting man [mard-i zan-numa] who makes 
himself up as a woman and works at one of Tehran’s popular musical [saz-u-
zarbi] café-restaurants. Yesterday evening, Akbar, with wig and heavy make-up, 
left home to go to work.” He was followed and harassed by a group of young 
men, and eventually attacked them with a knife, injuring one of them, who filed a 
complaint. The paper added, “The officers [at the police station] indicated that he 
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 had been booked several times in the past on the charge of taking advantage of 
men; he sits at café customers’ tables, looking like a woman, and taking 
advantage of them.”26
In the context of Tehran’s nightlife, a “distancing” style of feminine 
mimesis could signal particular kinds of gender/sexual desire: it could be enacted 
by males who wanted to present themselves as female-acting non-females (thus 
the need for “distancing exaggerations”) who wanted to be desirable to men who 
desired female-presenting non-females. At the same time, some males opted 
for “complete” mimesis—working as female dancers and intending to be taken 
totally for women. This style of mimesis allowed some males to live as women.27 
Such, for instance, was the case of one café dancer known as Nargis Salihi who 
was believed to be a woman and had worked for five years before it was found 
out that s/he was born male, as Nasir Salihi. [Figure 30.3] The “outing” resulted 
from a café scuffle that led to Salihi and a number of clients being detained at the 
local police station. When interrogated at the police station, Salihi explained that 
she had moved to Tehran from the small provincial town of Arak five years ago. 
Because she “was very fond of wearing women’s clothes,” she explained, “I 
made myself look like a young woman. I then went to the town registry in Ray [at 
the time, a small suburb of Tehran] and declared my birth certificate lost and 
requested a new one in the name of Nargis Salihi. With the new birth certificate, I 
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 began a career of singing and dancing and have developed a circle of admirers.” 28
 
<INSERT FIGURE 30.3>
 
Both styles of self-fashioning continue to inform MtF public presentations in Iran 
today, and are often cause for tension between those who want to completely 
live as women, and thus argue against the exaggerated femaleness of those other 
MtFs, who, in their opinion, “are giving a bad name to the community.”29 In 
the 1970s, these two analytically distinct styles of male non-heteronormativity 
existed more as a continuum, which also included a range of other strategies for 
males-living-as-women. Some were individuals such as Nargis, who lived as 
women without undergoing any form of medicalized body modification, but a 
growing number of people opted for various degrees of hormonal and surgical 
intervention.
The world of non-heteronormative males was visible in the 1970s not only 
in the world of “gritty” entertainment. The upper echelons of an expansive art 
world—painters, photographers, television producers and performers—were also 
rumored to harbor non-masculine males. Indeed, the two poles of the culture 
industry were not sealed off from each other. At elite parties catering to males 
who dressed as women, members of high society mingled with khanums who 
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 worked in menial day jobs.30 One difference was that the very rich could dress at 
home and be safely driven to such parties by their chauffeurs, whereas the less 
affluent had to change clothes on arrival. These get-togethers were the non-
heteronormative male equivalent of daureh parties (women’s-night-out parties 
that rotated on a circuit between different women’s homes). The more well-to-do 
males would throw lavish parties and invite the rest of their circles —sometimes 
numbering in the hundreds. 
Not all men-loving men in Iran during this period opted for feminine 
styles, of course.31 Many lived lives scarcely distinguishable from other men, but 
they often socialized with the more “flamboyant” non-masculine-attired males.32 
These spaces of socialization gained the name of “gay parties” or “gay bars” in 
international gay media coverage, as well as in collective memories of 1970s 
Tehran for Iranians in later decades. But males-living-as-women who socialized 
through these networks did not consider themselves homosexual, and they 
defined their relationship with men in heterosexual terms. Within these intimate 
[khaudi] circles, they addressed each other by their female names. Many lived 
double lives. By day they dressed as men and went to work as such; some were 
even married and had children. At night, they lived as women.33 The parties they 
attended were not a space for finding potential lovers or partners, but rather a 
place to dance and have fun, to exchange gossip about one’s adventures, and to 
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 meet people like oneself (which by definition excluded people who were one’s 
target of desire). 
Some of these trends continue into the present. Today’s “gay parties” 
similarly are seen to be for people of the same kind. Behzad, a gay-identified man 
in his early fifties when I interviewed him in Tehran in 2007, seemed resigned to 
a single life. When I asked him why he didn’t go to gay parties to try to meet 
someone, he was puzzled: “why would I go to a party to spend time with people 
like myself? Years ago, in my twenties and thirties, when I was still trying to 
figure things out for myself, I used to go to some of these parties—they are good 
for the younger folk so they don’t feel they are the only ones who are not like 
others.”34 Cyrus, a gay-identified man in his early thirties, similarly did not 
consider the parties a place to find a partner, describing them rather as places “for 
hanging out with like-minded men.” He met his last two partners at the gym, and 
noted: “the men who pick me up, they are all either married—and I move away 
from them as soon as I find out—or else I lose them to marriage sooner or later. It 
is very depressing.”35 The distinction within the party scene that Behzad and 
Cyrus both described is between those who (like them) do not look very different 
from straight men, and those who have what Behzad called “girlie-like” styles of 
self-presentation. But all the attendees would be looking “out there,” not within 
the gay parties, for potential lovers and partners. This structure of desire and 
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 identification reflects the dominance of a larger discourse in twentieth-century 
Iran that has transformed males and females into “opposite sexes,” and which 
depends on the notion that “opposites attract”—a discourse that sets the 
parameters of sexual/gender subjectivity, whether normative or not.36 
We have no ethnographies, nor published memoirs, that would help map 
this non-heteronormative culture in the 1970s. We have instead a vast circulation 
of rumors from the time that have since acquired the status of fact. It was, and 
still often is, said that by the 1970s Iranian television had become a safe heaven 
for gay men, who enjoyed the protection of not only Reza Qotbi, the director of 
National Iranian Radio and Television and a cousin of Queen Farah Pahlavi, but, 
somewhat equivocally, of the Queen herself. When the Tehran daily Kayhan 
published a report about the purported wedding celebration of two gay men in a 
club, the Queen is said to have reacted negatively and asked the men involved and 
their friends to behave more responsibly and avoid such excesses in the future. In 
their defense, the men are said to have clarified that the celebration was a birthday 
party that had been misreported in the press.37 Kavus, a self-identified gay in his 
late fifties in 2007, similarly recalled the public view of such marriages as a 
misrecognition: “How could two khanums get married?” He laughed. He 
described such occasions as carnivalesque “dressing-up parties,” in which two 
khanums would present themselves as a bride and groom.38 In real life, he 
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 added, “both of them would be interested in straight [pronounced as in English] 
married men. Targeting married men was like a conquest, a proof of 
womanliness. In these parties, they would brag about who had succeeded in 
breaking up which marriage.” If a khanum developed a special relationship with a 
lover, sometimes, s/he would “marry” this guy. But the occasion was not a public 
ritual, nor was it celebrated by a “wedding party.” At most, for a keepsake, they 
would go to a commercial photographer for a “wedding portrait,” for the occasion 
of which the khanum might change into a wedding gown. 
 
The Shame of Unmanly Males and the Hope of Gender Ambiguity 
 
The emergence in the 1970s of more visible scenes of non-heteronormative 
maleness, along with increased knowledge of such scenes circulating in 
speech and print, was widely perceived as a moral corruption of Iranian 
culture through Westernization. The perception had class connotations: only 
elite society in Tehran was assumed capable of fostering such calamities. 
The extensive circulation of extravagant rumors about high-society circles 
of non-heteronormative males became part of the criticism of Pahlavi Court 
culture, which was seen as corrupt and as encouraging further corruption. 
While subsequent to the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the world-
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 wide growth of Islamist movements, one tends to associate such criticism with 
an “Islamist backlash,” in the 1970s, attacks against an “excess of cultural 
liberties” were a much more broadly voiced concern.39 What sustained the power 
of non-heteronormative maleness as a sign of excessive liberty (or, as it was 
by then commonly called “Westoxication”),40 was the overwhelming feeling 
of shame and disgust associated with any public spectacle of non-masculine 
maleness and non-heteronormative sexuality.
What made “it”—this preferably un-named horror—a cultural assault and 
moral insult was above all not its putative Western origin, but the shame of being 
kuni. The most derogatory word in realm of sexuality, kuni literally means anal, 
but in Persian it exclusively means to be receptive of anal penetration. Young 
male adolescents often first become familiar with the word as that which signals 
the edge of abjection; for instance, when parents warn their young son to stay 
away from certain activities (such as dance) and from certain (ill-reputed) 
persons, lest they become kuni. The equivalent word for women, baruni, does 
similar disciplinary work, but its moral load is much lighter.41
The gut-shame associated with kuni seems to have made it resistant to any 
measure of self-appropriation and re-signification. When the word gay began to 
arrive in Tehran from the West, some did not take to it. Behzad said he 
initially “disliked gay because in my mind I would translate it into kuni and I 
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 stayed away from it.”42 Ironically, the more recent acceptance and circulation of 
gay in Persian signifies the same thing: the need for a word that is not-kuni. 43 
What does that “gut” feeling of revulsion speak to? Why does the spectral threat 
of be(com)ing kuni seem to be so shattering to a modern (male) Iranian’s sense of 
self? It is impossible—or, at any rate, it is not my project—to give a convincing 
etiology of disgust. But it is critical to ask what cultural work disgust performs. 
What does it do to “the disgusting”? What does it achieve for “the disgusted”? 
Miller asks, “Why is it that disgust figures so prominently in routine moral 
discourses, even more so perhaps than the idioms of other moral emotions such as 
guilt and indignation?”44 And how does this sense of profound aversion to kuni 
relate to the rise in visibility and the increasing prevalence of MtF trans 
inflections of woman-presenting maleness? 
Another source of anxiety directed at males in the 1970s was that 
of “gender confusion,” or ambiguity. Numerous social commentators wrote 
essays about the current state of youth lamenting the disappearance of manly 
valor, and of young men with long hair whose demeanor was that of a flirtatious 
girl, especially when they danced to rock music—all in “blind imitations of the 
West.”45 For a modern Iranian masculinity that had crafted itself through hetero-
gendering previously androgynous concepts of beauty, and by the adoption of 
more disciplined and uniform sartorial practices during the first half of the 
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 twentieth century, the new fashions and tastes of the young seemed nothing short 
of a threat to national honor. 
Part of this gender anxiety resided in fear of the failure of sex/gender 
recognition and of what that misrecognition would cause. One woman wrote:
Once upon a time when we looked at men, we had no doubt 
that they were men. But now with these Beatle-style hair-dos 
and [tight] pants that show the body and high-heel shoes and 
manicured nails, we are forced to look again and again to remove 
our doubt. In the old days, if you called a man woman, that was 
an insult, but now they try to make themselves look like women. 
Several days ago, in Nasir Khusrau Street in Tehran, I ran into 
a man who had braided hair, was displaying a lot of jewelry and 
exactly like women had plucked his eyebrows and wore heavy 
make-up. It is astonishing that these men who always considered 
women beneath them and thought of themselves as the superior sex 
are putting themselves in women’s place when it comes to dressing 
and make-up.46
Connecting such gender/sex ambiguity to sexual deviation was an easy 
imaginative leap. Under the bold headline, “The danger of women and men 
looking alike,” another newspaper article cautioned against the clothing, 
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 lifestyles, and work of women and men becoming too similar. This kind of 
confusion “threatens today’s civilization, in the same manner that two thousand 
years ago civilized nations such as Greece and Rome … were overthrown. In 
ancient Athens, before they were defeated by the Spartans, men had begun 
to make themselves up like women.… In ancient Rome too, similar things 
happened…. Moreover sexual deviancy, as it is today, became so prevalent that it 
caused their overthrow and destruction.”47 
The spaces opened up by a more visible non-heteronormative maleness 
and by gender/sex ambiguity nevertheless offered some hopeful possibilities for 
women-presenting males. As I have already argued, “Gay Tehran” was inclusive 
of a broad spectrum of male non-heteronormativity. Press reports of genital 
surgeries beginning to be performed in Iran at this time were particularly 
important in informing woman-presenting males of more affordable possibilities 
for changing their bodies, which until then had seemed to be available only at 
great cost in Europe. On 17 February 1973, the daily Kayhan (p. 19), under the 
headline “In Shiraz, a man voluntarily became a woman!” reported:
A thirty-one-year-old man was operated in Namazi Hospital in 
Shiraz and became a woman. This man, who does not wish to 
reveal his/her [non-gender marked pronoun u in original] identity, 
was a perfectly healthy man, but had an intense desire to become 
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 a woman and for a long time s/he was wearing women’s clothes 
and injected female hormones. The patient is a resident of Tehran, 
had consulted several psychologists before surgery, and the Legal 
Medical Board in Tehran and Shiraz considered the surgery 
permissible. The former man has said that soon s/he will be 
marrying a man who knows her/his condition completely. Doctors 
say s/he is capable of marriage.
Unlike previous reports of “sex-change” in Iran, which typically involved 
disambiguation surgery performed on intersex persons, this report specifically 
emphasized that the person had been “a perfectly healthy man.” Inadvertently, 
it also advertised to any interested reader what the process of sex-change would 
entail: psychological consultation and acquiring permission from the Legal 
Medical Board. Most hopefully, it ended in a “happy marriage.”
The next year, the women’s weekly Ittila‘at-i banuvan ran the life story of 
Rashil (formerly Sa‘id) Sa‘idzadeh over eight weeks.48 The coverage in a popular 
women’s weekly transformed the coverage of sex-change from short medical 
news items into a full-length, melodramatic human-interest story. In the first 
issue, a huge headline, running the entire width of the page, declared “The 28-
Year-Old Newborn to the World of Women.” A supra-title exclaimed “wondrous, 
extraordinary, unbelievable … but true!” while a subtitle explained that “‘Sa‘id’ 
24
 whom everyone thought of as a man has now become a coquettish woman!” 
Every week, the story was accompanied by her post-change photographs and, as 
if “seeing was not believing,” Rashil’s various medical and legal documents were 
reproduced as well. Most importantly, Rashil’s story was narrated as her own 
story and in the first person. After a long, patronizing, introductory editorial note 
in the first installment (as well as shorter editorials in every issue), the story 
unfolds in Rashil’s narrative voice. The sustained narrative, serialized in the 
tradition of short novellas, accompanied with her photographs and legal and 
medical documents, fully fleshed out the story of a livable sex/gender-transitioned 
life. This was not a story of misery, misfit, and disorder, though all these elements 
were part of her story. This was instead a “sweet and interesting” story with a 
happy ending. The eight-week run of Rashil’s story in a popular women’s 
weekly, which built upon previous decades of news of intersex surgeries reported 
as sex-change as well as reports of prominent international sex-change surgeries, 
transformed the idea of sex-change into a tangible possibility within public 
imagination. Rashil’s detailed life story contributed to a pattern of life-narratives 
that would structure much of the scientific and popular writings, including 
autobiographical writings, about transgender/sexuality to the present day.
 
<INSERT FIGURES 30.4 and 30.5> 
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As the story of Rashil Sa‘idzadeh indicates, it was still possible to write, 
even at great length, about trans persons (especially if their gender/sexual non-
normativity could be vaguely associated with a physical intersex condition) in a 
way that was unthinkable to write about non-surgically-modified, cross-dressed 
males living as women. Rashil’s story was framed with sympathy, and at times as 
a form of heroism that triumphed against all odds. The woman-presenting males, 
on the other hand, could be laughed at, mocked, sniggered about, or tolerated in 
hostile silence. They could be subject to moral outrage and criminal suspicion. By 
the mid-1970s, however, the medical establishment, possibly alarmed at the 
growing rate of sex-change surgeries performed outside any norms of institutional 
medical supervision, transferred the moral judgment against homosexuality onto 
trans persons. It took the professional and disciplinary power of the Medical 
Council of Iran (MCI) to bring the full weight of opprobrium associated with 
homosexuality to bear on the life-options of woman-presenting males, and 
thereby to delineate and enforce a kinship relationship between male 
homosexuality and MtF trans. 
 
Science Rules on Unmanly Males
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 Formed only in 1969, the Medical Council of Iran established a whole series of 
regulations for medical practice during the first years of its operation. It also acted 
as the authority where complaints about medical practice could be filed and 
reviewed.49 In the early 1970s, it began to produce guidelines on new medical 
practices, such as acupuncture. Indeed, its rulings on sex-change surgery and 
acupuncture were decided in the same session of the Board of Directors on 28 
September 1976. Alarmed by the apparent increase in genital surgeries among 
woman-presenting males, and by the growing public knowledge of these 
practices, the MCI decided to ban sex-change surgeries, except in the case of the 
intersex. A huge front-page headline in the daily Kayhan informed the public of 
this decision on 10 October 1976. The newspaper explained that the 
decision “meant that sex-change through surgical operations and the like which 
are aimed to solely change someone’s apparent condition is no longer permitted.” 
It quoted “an informed source” as saying that “this operation can cause 
psychological and physical harm and that is why MCI has banned it.… From now 
on any doctor who performs such operations will be legally prosecuted.” The 
paper added that, “up to now some 30 sex-change operations have been 
performed in Iran.”
 
<INSERT FIGURE 30.6>
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The full text of the decision was first published some three years later in the 
Newsletter of the Medical Council of Iran. It read:
 
In general, changing the apparent sex through surgical operations 
and the like is not possible, “neither from a psychological nor from 
a physiological respect.” Since this type of young men—who now 
insistently ask that their apparent condition be changed—cannot 
become a future perfect woman and become married to a man as 
a woman, and since the hole that is created for them will most 
likely become a source of chronic infections, and since there is 
a high probability that they will then express enmity toward the 
persons who have changed their condition and their sex, or at least 
they will express regret under conditions that a reversal to their 
prior condition is not possible, therefore such persons must be 
considered mental patients, they must be treated psychologically, 
and one cannot permit that they would be moved out of their 
current condition and appearance.50
The delay in publication perhaps indicated a level of disagreement among medical 
practitioners on this issue, and may have reflected debates within the medical 
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 community that dated back to the 1940s, when Iran’s preeminent gynecologist, 
Dr. Jahanshah Salih, in his seminal textbook, had argued strongly against the 
possibility, advisability, and morality of sex-change. Indeed, this difference of 
opinion continues to inform conceptions and practices of sex-change in Iran 
today. The statement is a remarkable document on many levels. It implies that to 
be a “perfect woman” is to be a perfect “hole,” and that surgically modified MtF 
trans individuals are deficient in womanhood to the extent that the surgeries they 
receive produce unsatisfactory holes. The concern expressed is evidently driven in 
part by the expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of surgery woman-presenting 
males were receiving. But it was also a move to put medicine’s house in order, in 
keeping with other efforts to promote professionalization. 
Officially, no sex-change surgeries took place in reputable hospitals after 
1976. Dr. Yahya Behjatnia was a prominent gynecologist who for many years 
headed the Family and Infertility Clinic of Jahanshah Salih Hospital in Tehran, 
the primary teaching hospital for gynecological training, and the hospital known 
for having a team of surgeons who operated on the intersex; he recalled that many 
woman-presenting males would visit him and beg him to change their sex. Often, 
he explained, by the time such persons would come to him for removal of male 
sexual organs and vaginal construction, they were already dressing as women and 
looking like women, and had already obtained hormonal treatment and already 
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 had breasts. But he would tell them that genital sex-change was not a permitted 
practice. If they insisted, he would advise them to go abroad for the surgery.51 
Some surgeons in the late 1970s, however, still carried out sex-change operations. 
They either did it surreptitiously in smaller private clinics, or they manipulated 
the medical system simply by listing their clients as intersex on hospital records.
Another prominent gynecologist, Dr. Mehdi Amir-Movahedi, was a 
highly regarded specialist in uterine surgeries, intersex surgeries, and vaginal 
construction for women who were born without vaginas, or with vaginas with 
very restricted openings.52 He served on the Board of Directors of MCI for 
several years, and he echoed the observations of his colleague Dr. Behjatnia. He 
compared the situation to that of women seeking abortion. At the time, this was 
illegal except under strict exemptions, such as a pregnancy that threatened the 
mother’s life. Yet with the right connections and money, many doctors would 
perform abortions.53 At Jahanshah Salih Hospital, Dr. Movahedi explained, “we 
were very strict, we would not do anything that was against regulations, nor 
would we train medical students for illegal surgeries. I worked there for some 20-
30 years and I do not recall a single case of sex-change surgery. If any of our 
trainees performed this in their own clinic, the MCI would prosecute them.” Why, 
then, did the MCI issue an official statement on sex change, I asked? “If there 
were any related complaints, it was not when I served there. But many in the old 
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 days would do things for money and perhaps that is what happened.”54 
Peculiarities in the timing of the publication of the MCI decision on 
surgical sex-change, coupled with later interviews with prominent gynecologists 
who worked at the time in Jahanshah Salih Hospital but insist that no sex-change 
surgeries were performed by reputable surgeons in this period, lead one to 
speculate that despite persistent disavowals, reputable surgeons were indeed 
carrying out a whole range of surgeries that began to endanger the reputability of 
other surgeons. The division was not a matter of differing professional opinions 
about the advisability of genital surgery for woman-presenting males; rather, it 
involved matters of moral reputation. By this time, in the dominant scientific 
discourse, intersex and trans persons had come to belong to distinctly different 
categories. The latter had become affiliated with sexual deviancy, rather than 
birth defect. It was the morality of sex change—or rather, the moral status of the 
persons requesting or performing sex change—that was at issue. This was indeed 
at the heart of public conversations at the moment of the MCI decision against 
surgical sex change in 1976.
The 1976 MCI decision had paradoxical effects. It must have made some 
surgeons more cautious about sex-change operations; but the practice of surgical 
sex-change continued, along with media interest in it. The medical community as 
well, even in the publications of the MCI itself, continued to produce articles that 
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 covered the subject of sex-change in supportive terms.55 Indeed, the MCI’s 
insistence on the impossibility of sex-change, along with the simultaneous 
banning of surgeries deemed impossible, combined with the prominent coverage 
of the decision in the national dailies, created a productive public conversation 
that circulated knowledge of surgical sex-change on an unprecedented scale. 
Against the MCI’s intentions, perhaps, the very possibility of such operations 
came to broader attention. 
Noushin, for example, now in her fifties, said she had no idea such 
operations were possible in Iran before she read these newspaper reports. In the 
1970s, she socialized as part of circle of singers and entertainers. Her/his parents 
had noticed her/his “incredible voice” when s/he was a teenager, and encouraged 
her/him to take voice lessons. She became a singer, and continues to be much in 
demand even today, although she now performs only at private parties.56 Noushin 
counted among her friends many of the famous male and female vocal artists of 
the 1970s. She and another close friend, the son/daughter of a high-ranking army 
officer, had been planning in the mid-1970s to go to Europe for their sex-change 
surgeries. Her friend’s father was making arrangements for them to be seen at a 
famous London clinic. The MCI decision and the subsequent newspaper coverage 
made them realize they might possibly get what they wanted in Iran. Noushin and 
her friend visited Dr. Taqavi in Asia Hospital (the same hospital and surgeon who 
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 had operated on Rashil Sa‘idzadeh), as well as Dr. Behjatnia. Both advised them 
to go abroad under the current circumstances. Eventually, in 1977, after a period 
of hormone therapy in Iran, they both went abroad for their operations.57
Aside from going abroad or using “back-street” surgeons, the other option 
remained living as a woman-presenting male without surgical transformation 
(obtaining hormones seems to have continued to be as possible as before). Many 
took this latter route. One such woman-presenting male, now internationally 
known, was Maryam Khatun Mulk-ara.58 Born male in 1950, Mulk-ara, according 
to her many accounts of her earlier life, was already going out to parties dressed 
as a woman by her late teens.59 At age eighteen, walking home from such a party, 
a car stopped and she noticed the occupants were “three transsexual males just 
like me.” The moment she joined them in the car marked for Mulk-ara the 
beginning of a new life; she referred to this accidental meeting “as the true 
moment of my entry into a collectivity, a group of people like myself…. In those 
days, there was no distinction between gay, two-sexed people, or transsexuals. 
Everyone knew these individuals existed, but no one knew exactly what the 
problem was. People referred to all these individuals as ‘iva-khvahar’ [o’sister]” 
(p. 7). Mulk-ara described the gatherings and parties she attended with her friends 
as “a place where everyone was a woman, that is, even though they were known 
as males in social norms of recognition, but they were women. The ambience was 
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 just like the ambience of womanly gatherings. We talked about fashion and other 
women’s issues.”60 In the early 1970s, Mulk-ara started working at the Iranian 
National Radio and Television, and she went to work dressed as a woman. It was 
there that she was first encouraged to go abroad for a sex-change operation. She 
spent some time in London in 1975 to learn more about herself and to look into 
various possibilities, and it was there, she claimed, that she “learned about 
transsexuality and realized I was not a passive homosexual.”61 Upon returning 
from London, Mulk-ara began to lobby various authorities to see what could be 
done in Iran, but everyone told her that because of the prevailing social 
atmosphere, the government could not do anything. By this time, of course, the 
MCI had closed the emerging medical possibilities for sex-reassignment surgery 
in Iran. 
During this same period, Mulk-ara became concerned about the 
implications of her practices from a religious point of view. “I was in a religious 
conundrum [az lihaz-i shar‘i sardargan].” She visited Ayatollah Bihbihani, who 
consulted the Qur’an; it opened on the Maryam chapter. Mulk-ara consided this a 
very auspicious sign, for Maryam is the only chapter bearing a woman’s name; 
this occasion provided her with her eventual post-op name, Maryam). Ayatollah 
Bihbihani suggested that Mulk-ara should contact Ayatollah Khomeini on this 
issue, who at the time was in Najaf. Ayatollah Khomeini confirmed that “sex-
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 change was permitted and that after surgery, she must live her life as a woman.”62 
At this point, she began to plan to go to Thailand, but by then the years of 
revolutionary upheavals had erupted. 
Mulk-ara eventually did go to Thailand for her surgery, in 2002. But in the 
early months of 1979, once the general strikes came to an end, she, like most 
people, simply went back to work—and here her troubles began. “They asked me 
who are you? Why do you look like this? When I insisted that I had a condition, 
they set up a meeting for me with a doctor at Day Clinic [a top private clinic]. But 
the doctors’ treatment of me was unbelievable; it was gross. This was just the 
beginning of a series of arrests, questioning me over and over again.… Dr. Bahr 
al-‘Ulum and the director of Sida va Sima’s [the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting (IRIB), which was previously National Iranian Radio and 
Television (NIRT)] health clinic threatened me, saying they would set me on fire. 
Eventually they forced me to take male hormones and go into male clothes.… 
This kind of treatment continued till early 1980s; these were bad years for gays 
and dau-jinsi [double-sex] people. I heard several were arrested and spent time at 
Evin prison.”
Mulk-ara was not the only woman-presenting male forced out of NIRT/
IRIB. Haideh, now in her late forties, used to teach animation classes there before 
she was expelled. Eventually, she opted for sex-change in the late 1990s and now 
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 has her own graphic design business. Natasha was a young make-up artist, 
similarly forced out of NIRT/IRIB. For a while, she tried to find jobs in private 
film studios, but these studios were also under increasing scrutiny for perceived 
immoral conduct. Eventually, she opened her own hair-dressing salon and has 
become quite well-known in Tehran. Today, two other MtFs are also employed in 
her salon.
In the early 1980s, as the Islamic Republic was taking shape, Maryam 
Mulk-ara began her persistent lobbying of various authorities to change the 
situation for woman-presenting males who did not wish to dress and live as men. 
Under the new regime, the moral purification of society became a systemic 
priority. Moral purification measures included closing down sites that were 
considered spaces of corruption, such as the red-light district businesses, bars, 
night-clubs, and many cafés and cinemas. It meant a series of horrifying public 
executions of women and men on charges of prostitution and sodomy. It meant 
intense scrutiny of all institutions, especially those such as the mass media and 
the universities, which were considered critical for production of a new 
revolutionary Islamic culture and society, but were thought to be populated by 
corrupt persons who had to be purged. As Mulk-ara put is in her interview, these 
were indeed “bad years for gays and dau-jinsi people.” 
The spectrum of non-heteronormative male-bodied persons in the 1970s 
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 had included woman-presenting males as well as males who did not dress as or 
look like women. The latter’s non-heteronormativity was focused on their desire 
for men, while they continued to live lives largely indistinguishable—to the 
uninitiated—from normative males. These males, some of whom now name 
themselves as gay or are so named by others, had shared in the increased visibility 
of non-heteronormative males of the 1970s. That visibility became dangerous in 
the years following the 1979 change of regime. These men had to adopt a more 
circumspect style of life, something that indeed had been a way of life for many 
of them already. But while the sexual politics of the new government could be 
warded off by some non-heteronormative males simply by living more 
circumspect lives, woman-presenting males faced a peculiar challenge in the new 
republic, when public gender-separation emerged as an important ethical project. 
A totally homosocial gendering of public spaces was seen as the ideal, although it 
was considered largely unachievable in practice. Nevertheless, strict codes of 
dress and gender presentation in public were put in place by a series of measures 
over the period 1979-81.63 The self-perceptions and preferred styles of living for 
some non-heteronormative males included, and at times critically depended on, 
their ability to present themselves as women and to be visibly feminine in 
public—but the gender norms set in place in the early days of the IRI made that 
nearly impossible. As Mulk-ara and others explained, many people like her felt 
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 forced to grow mustaches and beards and live, at least in daytime, as men. Living 
a double life by presenting as a woman at night, which was practiced by many 
woman-presenting males even in the 1970s, suddenly became much more 
hazardous, to the extent that it remained possible at all. 
As we have seen, in the 1970s, woman-presenting males had carved for 
themselves spaces of relative acceptance in particular places and professions. The 
more public spaces of such “acceptability,” for instance in the entertainment 
industry, were at once spaces of “disrepute” but also spaces in which non-
normative living could be safely cordoned off and marginalized. They provided 
not only a measure of safety for woman-presenting males, but also for their 
containment and confinement from the larger society. Woman-presenting males 
performed the vulgar and the deviant, and the deployment of these semi-licit 
styles in the popular entertainment of the 1970s provided for partial tolerance of 
those deemed deviant.64 The 1979 revolution, particularly the cultural purification 
campaigns of the first few years of the new republic, ruptured this dynamic. The 
vulgar, taken in the Islamist discourse (and indeed on the political Left as well) to 
represent the extreme embodiment of late-Pahlavi corruption, became yet another 
ground for massive repression of social deviance. 
The enforcement of public gender codes in the post-1979 years disrupted 
the old continuum of male non-heteronormativity. While it was possible to be a 
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 closeted gay man, living openly as a woman-presenting male became increasingly 
impossible. Woman-presenting males not only carried the stigma of male same-
sex practices, they also transgressed the newly imposed regulations of gendered 
dressing and presentation in public. They were always assumed to be “passive 
homosexuals,” facing the same severe interrogations, sometimes anal rape, 
imprisonment, or death. Transdressed males walking in the streets would be 
arrested on charges of prostitution. Some, like Mulk-ara, were forced to take male 
hormones and change into male clothing, and could no longer go to work 
looking “like that.” One key effect of the policies of the early 1980s was thus the 
categorical bifurcation of gay and transsexual. The practices of everyday life 
within both categories depended on the public disavowal of homosexuality, and 
both were likewise predicated on the public expression of gender normativity. 
Given the religious sanction to sex-change offered by Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
categorical bifurcation of non-heteronormative maleness played out quite 
differently in the IRI, in the years ahead, than it did in Europe and the United 
States. Being transsexual, rather than gay, emerged as the more socially 
acceptable way of being a non-heteronormative male.
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University of California Press, 2005) for some examples of “keeping a young 
man” (amrad-dari, adam-dari), as it was then called.
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13. Kayhan, January 5, 1977, 2, and again January 6, 1977, 1.
14. See Chapter Two of my manuscript, Sex-in-Change: Configurations 
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(2008), 211-238. Quote from 234.
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 19. Shay, “The Male Dancer,” 139.
20. Zan-push, literally meaning dressed in women’s clothes, refers to male 
actors who played women’s roles in traditional theatrical performances, whether 
in passion plays (ta‘zieh) or in ruhauzi plays (literally over the pond, because 
the stage was provided with covering a garden pond with planks of wood) at 
celebratory occasions. For an important analysis of different styles of enacting 
female personas in these plays, see William O. Beeman, “Mimesis and Travesty 
in Iranian Traditional Theatre,” in Gender in Performance: The Presentation of 
Difference in the Performing Arts, ed. Laurence Senelick (Medford, MA: Tufts 
University Press, 2002), 14-25. The expression zan-push has now become part of 
trans-vocabulary for MtFs who change to female clothes.
21. Khvandaniha October 1, 1955, 37. Parenthetical punctuations in original. 
Other issues of this journal similarly carried news and photographs of male 
actors in female roles. See October 13, 1955, 37, for a picture of Majid Muhsini 
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